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Studies of the returns to education have generally investigated the
relationship between individuals' investments in formal education and
on-the-job training and their labor-market productivity.Itiswell
recognized, however, that other factors besides formal education and
training contribute to a person's effective stock of human capital (and
hence to productivity); these factors include early childhood environment,
parents' behavior (see Dugan 1969), and associations with other indi-
viduals. There is general agreement, for example, that a child's develop-
ment is affected by the ability and performance of peers in school. At a
later stage, a significant part of an individual's college and graduate
education appears to result from association with fellow students, the more
able students contributing to the education of all. After formal schooling
is completed, close associates are likely to continue to affect an individual's
further educational development and to influence the rate of depreciation
of the individual's stock of knowledge.
One of the more persuasive explanations of the observed strong positive
relationship between formal education and labor-market productivity is
that, in addition to providing specific skills, formal education improves
the individual's ability to acquire and assimilate information, to perceive
and understand changing conditions, and to respond effectively.1 From
T. DUDLEY WALLACE
nodel and data would be
paper and that by Becker,
re broughtin by ad hoc
theory. This makes for a
he equations that Freiden
considerations.
that may have marginal
redates progressive income
Tiage incidence in modern
vorcc costs probably vary
thus, the index used by
groups. Divorce costs in
assets. Also, lowering the
iages is the effect of the
pecific to the individual
erences in the analysis of
pie, specific information
hildren, or length of time
e amenable to resolution
f the less intensive wage
f marriage increases the
household production is
e basic Becker theory is
of "likelihood," one
to be explored. Whether




to unexplored terrain is
er theory and the Freiden
The steps are worthwhile
I thank Alexandra Benham for comments and substantial assistance throughout this
study; Gary Becker, Solomon Polachek, Robert Michael, and T. W. Schultz for helpful
comments; and Elayne Howard for analyzing the data. The investigation was partly
supported by I'HS grant HS0008O from the National Center for Health Services Research
and Development.
'In his study of migration, Aba Schwartz (1968) found results consistent with the
hypothesis that one effect of education is to reduce the cost of obtaining information. The
responsiveness of individuals to lifetime.earnings differentials was found to increase
monotonically with education. Finis Welch (1970) distinguishes between the worker
effect and the allocative effect of education. He argues: "Much of the 'leverage' associated
with added schooling is drawn from the dynamic implications of changing technology."
That is, education enables an individual to adapt more rapidly to changing conditions.
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this perspective, associates can contribute to a person's effective stock of
education in at least three ways: (1) by providing a close substitute for
the person's own formal education by extending information and advice,
(2) by helping the person acquire specific skills, and (3) by helping the
person acquire general skills related to information acquisition and
assimilation and coping with change.
There are obvious limitations to the extent to which one person can
benefit from another's experience and advice. Some individuals are better
able than others to reap such benefits. Nevertheless, persons having
exposure to individuals with a greater or different stock of knowledge
should on average benefit from such exposure.2 To the extent that this is
true, an individual's effective stock of acquired abilities will be a function
not only of his own formal education and job experience but also of
associates' education, the incentives the associates have to share their
knowledge, and the length of the association. This paper investigates this
transmission of educational benefits in one type of association: marriage.
Marriage is distinguished from most other nonmarket associations in
that there are greater incentives to share acquired abilities within the
household: both current and future benefits of increased knowledge by
either family member are typically shared. The costs of sharing would
also appear to be lower because the transactions cost of communication
within the household, given the proximity of spouses, is likely to be less
than in other types of associations. For these reasons, the household would
appear to provide a good opportunity to examine the benefits of associ-
ation.
In the traditional human capital literature, the individual is viewed
as a firm whose earnings (E,) at time t are a function of the individual's
stock of human capital (JIg), which in turn is composed of two elements,
the individual's net investment in formal education (S,) and net investment
in postschool on-the-job training (P,): E, = E(S1, Ps).
In the present study, the household firm composed of husband and
wife is investigated rather than the individual. The assumption is made
that the effective stock of human capital for each marriage partner
(H7* or J1,wa)isa positive function of the individual stock of human
capital of each spouse within the household: -
H,w*= H(H,", H,") and
H,H*=H(H,", H,"),
where eH,'*/aH/ > 0 for i, j=h, w.Boththe market and the nonmarket
The market provides this type of advisory service. Lawyers and professional counsel-
ors are among those whose stock in trade is advice. Actors, politicians, and athletes
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productivity of individuals within the household are functions of
Therefore, increments to the capital stock of either spouse should be
reflected in the productivity of both. While this model could thus be used
to examine both market and nonmarket productivity of husband and
wife, the following analysis is limited to an examination of the relationship
between husband's market productivity and both spouses' capital stock.4
The initial relationship examined is the extent to which the earnings of
a married man are positively related to his wife's stock of human capital,
measured here by the wife's years of schooling. To investigate this,
education of wives is incorporated into the model developed by Mincer
(1 970a) to estimate the returns to men's education.5 The logarithm of
husband's earnings is given as a function of the years of formal education
of each spouse and the years of employment experience of the husband.
The specification of the model is as follows:
ln EARN =ce+ flu EDH + fi2 EDW + fl3 EXP + fl4 EXP2 +
whereln EARN = annual earnings of husband in family with
husband and wife present, EDH =yearsof schooling completed by
husband, EDW =yearsof schooling completed by wife, and EXP =
yearsof work experience of husband.6 The coefficientsand fl2 are
estimates of the percentage earnings differentials to husband's and wife's
formal education, respectively, in terms of husband's market earnings,
given the other spouse's years of formal education and the husband's
work experience.7 Husband's work experience is entered in quadratic
form to approximate the postschool investment pattern usually assumed.
Data
Toestimate this model, data from three samples of the population of the
United States were used: the 1/1,000 sample of the U.S. Census for 1960
(U.S. Bureau of the Census 1964), a 1963 health survey conducted by the
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For a survey of current work on nonmarket productivity within the family, see T. W.
Schultz (l972a).
Sorting out the impact of household capital on the wife's market productivity appears
to be considerably more difficult than doing so for the husband's. Women have a lower
labor-force participation rate than men, and their participation is negatively related to
husbands' earnings (which are in turn positively related to husbands' education). A
lower participation rate means less job experience and lower market earnings. It is
beyond the scope of this paper to separate the effect of husband's human capital on wife's
job experience from the effect of husband's human capital on her market productivity.
This model is restrictive in that, for each spouse, the same percentage earnings
differentials are assumed for all years of schooling.
6Thenumber of years of job experience is here estimated as age minus years of
schooling minus 6.
Under a set of assumptions discussed in Mincer (1970a),is an estimate of the rate
of return to men's formal education.I
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Center for Health Administration Studies of the University of Chicago
and the National Opinion Research Center (Andersen and Anderson
1967), and the 1967 Survey of Economic Opportunity (SEO) conducted
by the Bureau of the Census for the Office of Economic Opportunity.
The subsamples used in this study include only married white males with
spouse present, not living on farms, and having positive earnings in the
survey year.8
Results
Table 1A shows the estimates of this model obtained from the three data
sets. The coefficient of wife's education is positive and significantly greater
than zero in all .cases. The simple null hypothesis that education of wife is
unrelated to husband's earnings can be rejected. Considering that three
separate data sources are used, the absolute value of andthe ratio
fJ2/fl1are remarkably stable. Given the level of husband's education and
his years of work experience, his earnings increase between 3.0 and 4.1
percent for each year of his wife's education.9
To examine the effects of wife's education on her husband's wages and
on his work time separately, the basic equation was reestimated using the
Census data with ln weekly wage rather than In annual earnings as the —
dependentvariable.'0 An additional estimate of this type was made
excluding husbands who were not working full time. The results, shown
in table 2, suggest that from 20 to 25 percent of the increase in a husband's
earningsis due to increases in weeks worked, and the remainder is due
to higher wages.
While these results are open to alternative interpretation, the observed
associations are hardly negligible, and they would appear to merit further
inquiry. If it can be established that all or even a substantial part of these
returns through a husband's earnings are due to the benefits of his wife's
8Thecharacteristics of the subsamples differed in some minor details. See notes to table
1 for subsample descriptions.
For purposes of comparison,is also calculated in table lB with wife's education
excluded from the estimating equation. In these estimates, the percentage differentials
in husbands' earnings associated with their own education range from 8.1 to 9.0 percent.
These estimates are lower than others have made. Part of the reason is that earnings
differentials associated with the education of never-married men and divorced men are
higher, although their absolute earnings are lower.
10Itis not obvious a priori whether a wife's education is positively or negatively
associated with a husband's market-work time. An increase in a wife's education leads to u
increases in her own market and nonmarket productivity. Specialization within the
family between market and nonmarket activity will depend in part on the comparative 8
advantageof each spouse in these activities. If education increases the wife's market
production relative to her nonmarket productivity, this will increase the incentive for her
to specialize more in market activities and raise the incentive for her husband to spend
more time in nonmarket production. However, insofar as a wife's education increases
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education, this has important implications both for our interpretation of
the returns to education for men and women and for our understanding
of the market returns to marriage.
The assumption underlying the previous specification is that a wife's
education has a constant percentage impact on earnings over the life
cycle. If the view is taken that the husband's earnings reflect an accumul-
ation of the stock of acquired abilities (human capital) within the house-
hold, there are several reasons for expecting earnings to be a function not
only of the wife's education but also of the length of marriage. First, the
incentives for the husband to acquire on-the-job training are a positive
function of the expected time in labor-market activities. Since his labor-
market time is positively related to his wife's education, as shown in
table 2, his incentive to invest in on-the-job training should also be
associated with his wife's education.'1 Second, if the complementarity
between formal education and postschool investment also holds between
a wife's formal education and her husband's postschool investment, this
would also tend to raise the husband's postschool investment as a function
of his wife's education. Third, if a wife's education increases her husband's
earnings by reducing the depreciation rate of his stock of knowledge, then
the full impact of the wife's education would not be observed immediately
upon marriage but only over time as different rates of depreciation resulted
in different earnings patterns. Further, if costs of communicating know-
ledge or learning are inversely related to the time span available, then a
husband is not likely to gain the full benefit of his wife's education at the
start of marriage.12
Although the quantitative importance of each of these arguments in
postmarriage capital accumulation is not known, they all imply that the
husband's absolute earnings should increase, at least initially, as a function
of the length of marriage. While the a priori case is less clear for the per-
centage differentials in earnings, these arguments suggest increasing
percentage differentials during the first years of marriage. To examine the
life-cycle pattern of husband's earnings as a function of wife's education,
Since the labor-force participation of wives and the interval between marriage and
first births are positively correlated with wives' education, women could also be financing
more on-the-job training for their husbands.
52 Even the benefits provided by the wife's direct advice and knowledge (rather than
by her increasing her husband's stock of knowledge and skills) are not necessarily realized
at the time the information is available to her husband. The economic consequences of
many career decisions are observable only after several years. This point could also be
made concerning the benefits of one's own education. Even with no postschool investment,
the better-educated person will presumably be better able to anticipate events. Since the
benefits derived from this improved ability to predict are observed only after some period
of time (i.e., after the person has been able to profit as a result of his earlier decisions),
the relative (observed) earnings over time should reflect these differential abilities in
anticipating change, and those who anticipate better may have increasing relative
earnings over time.382 LEE BENHAM WOMEN'S EDUCATION
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NOTE—Given education of husband, husband's years of experience, and square of husband's years of
experience.
*See table I fordescription.
thebasic equation was estimated for four 10-year length-of-marriage
intervals (table 3).
In both estimates'3 offl2 the differential increases after the first decade
of marriage and declines again during the latter years. The full benefits
from association within the household are, therefore, not observed at the
time of marriage. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that the
rate of postschool capital accumulation within the family during the first
years of marriage is a positive function of the wife's education and that
the incentives to maintain investment within the family diminish as the
working life shortens.'4
Selective-mating Hypothesis
Perhaps the principal alternative argument to the family-firm hypothesis
for the observed relationship between husband's earnings and wife's
education is the hypothesis of selective mating, which in this context
asserts that, in an education cohort of males, the more productive males
marry more highly educated females. Unfortunately, devising a test which
provides clear evidence concerning the relative importance of selective
mating versus household-capital formation does not appear straight-
forward. One difficulty is that, while the household hypothesis has some
13Onlythe SEO and U.S. Census data contain information on length of marriage.
t4 Since cross-sectional data are used here, there are several problems associated with
inferences drawn about life-cycle behavior. The prior lifetime circumstances of younger
and older adults were in many ways very different. The younger persons with 12 years of
schooling not only had more days in school per year but presumably had better-quality
instruction than the older persons. Other characteristics also differed over the age groups,
including the proportion who came from agricultural backgrounds and the size of city of
residence. It is noteworthy, however, that the pattern was generally the same in 1959
as in 1967. For both dates, husband's earnings as a function of wife's education were
higher for the second than for the first decade of marriage, and they declined between
the third and fourth decades. This is not consistent with a pure cohort effect. I appreciate
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relatively unambiguous implications concerning earnings patterns, almost
any result is consistent with some variant of the selective-mating hypo-
thesis. The problems here are similar to those faced in the human capital
literature with regard to alternative explanations for the positive correl-
ation between schooling and earnings. Schooling could be either serving
as a screening device or augmenting human capital. Our understanding
of this latter issue has been due primarily to the accumulation of evidence
on the consistency of earnings patterns with implications of the theory of
human capital rather than to tests which clearly distinguish between the
two hypotheses. Similarly, no clear tests of the household-capital versus
the selective-mating hypothesis are examined here, but some evidence
can be brought to bear on this issue.
If the selective-mating hypothesis is refined to mean that, within a
given education cohort of males, the more productive males marry
females who are more highly educated at the time of marriage, it implies
that a husband's earnings should be much more strongly associated with
his wife's premarriage education than with her postmarriage education,
ceteris paribus. The educational attainment of the wife at the time of
marriage is not indicated in any of the data samples used, but the wife's
age at the time of marriage is included in the U.S. Census and SEO data,
and from this two indirect tests can be made. First, an examination is
made of the relationship between the wife's age at marriage and her
husband's earnings. The argument is that, for any given level of a wife's
schooling, the younger she is at the time of marriage the less likely she is
to have completed her education, and hence, according to the variant of
the selective-mating hypothesis proposed above, the less likely she is to
marry a highly productive male. This hypothesis is not supported by
table 4, which shows the partial relationship between wife's age at
marriage and husband's earnings to be consistently negative.1
An alternative way of examining this same question is to estimate the
years of education completed by the wife at the time of marriage and to
examine the husband's earnings differentials associated with his wife's
pre- and postmarriage education. The estimates in table 5 suggest that the
relationships between wife'spre- and postmarriage education and
husband's earnings 'arevery similar,'6that women's postmarriage
Several alternative forms of the variable "age of wife at marriage" were considered.
These included dummy variables for each marriage age (18—25) and combinations of
continuous and dummy variables. For those women marrying either at a relatively
'young age (18 or under) or at a relatively late age (25 and over), husband's earnings were
generally lower than for women married between ages 18 and 25. For the intervening
years, the association between wife's age at marriage and husband's earnings was either
negative or essentially zero. An alternative hypothesis consistent with results in table 4 is
that wife's age at marriage is serving as a proxy for husband's work experience.
16Theseestimates should be viewed somewhat cautiously, since a purely random
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education is at least as strongly associated with husbands' earnings as is
their premarriage education.'7
Another variant of the selective-mating hypothesis states that a
education is only a proxy for other background characteristics of both
spouses, such as intelligence and social class. Should these latter variables
be associated both with husband's earnings and with wife's own educa-
tional attainment, then the association noted between the wife's education
and the husband's earnings may be spurious. This argument has its
counterpart in the recurring question of the extent to which an in-
dividual's education itself results in higher earnings versus the extent to
which education is merely a proxy for intelligence, social background,
and so forth.
Data on background variables were not available in the samples used
for tables 1—5. However, this issue has been examined in another context
by Duncan, Featherman, and Duncan (1972, p. 178) in a study of the
relationship between the occupational status of husbands and the back-
ground characteristics (including education) of both spouses.18 A multiple
regression was computed of husband's occupational status in 1956 on his
background characteristics, including his education, his occupational
status at marriage and his father's occupational status, and his wife's back-
ground characteristics, including her education, her father's occupational
status, her intelligence, and a psychological index of her drive to get
ahead. All the coefficients for wife's characteristics except education were
less than two times their standard error. This is consistent with the hypo-
thesis that the wife's education has a significant independent effect on the
husband's career development.
These results, however, are not directly comparable to those presented
in tables1—5, since occupational status rather than earnings is the
dependent variable. By using another data set developed by Blau and
Duncan (1967), it is possible to obtain more directly comparable results
by estimating the relationship between husband's income in 1961 and
both spouses' education, given several of the husband's background
Analternative explanation concerning the strong relationship between wife's
postmarriage education and husband's earnings is that husbands with higher earnings
purchase more postmarriage education for their wives. To examine this question, a
sample was drawn of husbands of ages 20—30 having 12 or more years of school who
were employed full time during the week of the 1960 U.S. Census survey. For this group,
median income was calculated for husbands whose wives were in school and for those
whose wives were not in school. Only 2.4 percent of the men in this sample had a wife in
school, so results should be viewed with appropriate caution; but in all men's education
categories except 12 years, the median income was lowerforthose men with wives in
school.
Thedata used for these estimates were for couples who had recently had a second
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The following three specifications were used to estimate the impact of
including husband's background characteristics using these data:
INCOME =+ /3,EDH+ $2 EDW + p,
INCOME =c,+EDH+ $2 EDW
+EDHF+OCHF+ iz, and
INCOME =+/3,EDH+ $2 EDW
+ /33EDHF+OCHF+ /35OCHJ+
where INCOME =husband'sincome in1961, EDH =husband's
education, EDW =wife'seducation, EDHF =husband'sfather's
education, OCHF =husband'sfather'soccupation, and OCHJ =
husband'soccupational status on his first job. Due to the nature of the
available data,2° these specifications differ from the earlier ones in this
paper in that income rather than in earnings is the dependent variable
and husband's work experience is not included.2' Nevertheless, they
provide qualitative estimates of the relative importance of husband's
background characteristics.
Table 6 shows the relative impact of wife's education as compared with
husband's education on husband's income ($2/Ps) by age of wife. These
estimates are Consistent with those presented earlier. There is a sub-
stantial relationship between wife's education and husband's income in
most years. For wives of ages 22—26, husband's income increases 37
percent as much with an increase in wife's education as with a similar
increase in husband's own education. This ratio increases to 80 percent
for wives ages 32—36 and then declines at older ages, a pattern similar to
that shown in table 3.
When husband's father's occupation and education are included, the
pattern is very similar.22 Except for the oldest group, these results are not
consistent with the hypothesis that the association between wife's education
WOMEN'S EDUCATION BENEFITS 387 LEE BENUAM
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19 Datawere collected from 20,700 respondents representing men in the U.S. civilian
noninstitutional population between the ages of 20 and 64 in March 1962 (see Duncan
et a!. 1972, p. 32).
20ProfessorOtis Dudley Duncan generously provided the correlation matrices which
he had developed for table 8.16 in.Duncan et al. (1972, p. 240). The estimates shown here
were calculated from those matrices.
21Theconsequences of excluding the husband's work-experience variables are less
severe here since separate estimates are made for each of eight age-of-wife categories.
22Inclusionof father's education and occupation reduces the education coefficient for
both spouses. The ratio of the husband's education coefficient when his father's education
and occupation are included to the husband's education coefficient when they are ex-
cluded, by wife's, age, is as follows: wife's age 22-26 (.91), 27—31 (.81), 32—36 (.80),
37—41 (.82), 42—46 (.87), 47—51 (.85), 52—56 (.85), and 57—61 (.80).388 LEEBENHAM
TABLE 6
RATIO OF INCREASE IN HUSBAND'S INCOME AS A FUNCTION OF WIFE'S EDUCATION
TO INCREASE IN HUSBAND'S INCOMEASA FUNCTION OF HUSBAND'S EDUCATION,














tion at first job 41*.62t1.22t.52t.26t.37f.18*.04
NOTE—The ratio /32/fl, is given in this table.
Coefficient of wife's education greater than Its standard error but less than twice as great (in absolute
value).
t Coefficient of wife', education greater than twice its standard error (in absolute value).
Conclusions
Several tentative conclusions may be drawn from the results above:
1. A shift in emphasis from the individual to the family unit may not
only facilitate understanding of productivity and efficiency within the
23 Not surprisingly, when husband's occupational status on his first job is entered, the
coefficient of husband's education is reduced. The ratio of husband's education coefficient
when father's background characteristics and husband's occupational status on first job
are included to husband's education coefficient when only the spouses' own educations
are included, by age of wife, is as follows: wife's age 22—26 (.67), 27—3 1 (.70), 32—36 (.57),
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When the husband's occupational status on his first job is included, the
wife's education remains statistically significant for wives between ages
27 and 51.23 Selective mating based on the husband's occupational
status on his first job does not explain the association between his income
and his wife's education.
Obviously, other evidence will be required before the relative im-
portance within the family of selective mating versus benefits of wife's
education can be determined. However, a significant positive relationship
between husband's earnings and wife's education, given the husband's
own education and job experience, has been found, and further evidence
has been examined which might have contradicted the household hypo-












first job is included, the
for wives between ages
husband's occupational
tion between his income
before the relative im-
iersus benefits of wife's
ant positive relationship
n, given the husband's




te family unit may not
efficiency within the
i his first job is entered, the
band's education coefficient
pational status on first job
ic spouses' own educations
),27—31 (.70), 32—36 (.57),
(.57).
T
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home but also usefully extend our understanding of the effects of education
on labor-market productivity.
2. The traditional human capital literature has emphasized formal
schooling and on-the-job training as the locations where individuals
accumulate their human capital. The results in this paper are consistent
with the view that there is substantial capital accumulation within the
household.
3. Labor-market benefits to men appear to be associated with their
marrying well-educated women. These benefits have implications not
only for earnings but also for the characteristics of marriage partners
selected and the stability of marriages.
4. The wife's education provides substantial labor-market benefits to
the family beyond increments to her own earnings. Both the private and
social market returns to women's education may be higher than has been
generally believed. The flavor of some past discussions of women's
education has suggested that it is an indulgence of an affluent society.
Perhaps the affluence has been more a function of women's education
than has been heretofore realized.The advantage of thi
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CityUniversity of New York and National Bureau of Economic Research
I have been tempted to write a note on the social cost of the "marriage-
go-round." In a nutshell, the idea is that more productive marriage
partners are preferred and that, on balance, net productivity in marriage
is positively related to education. Increased education serves to increase
an individual's chance of a good marriage, of marriage to a "more"
educated spouse. If an individual's social product is independent of his
spouse's education, then the marriage-go-round results in overinvestment
in education. Benham's view that a person's own productivity depends on
attributes of the spouse is a clear alternative.
My skepticism concerning Benham's hypothesis that a husband's
earning capacityispositively related to his wife's schooling isnot
qualitative but quantitative. How important are these (very likely
positive) cross-productivity effects? I was not surprised to hear of the
positive association between wife's schooling and husband's earnings. I
was surprised that most emphasis is on productivity instead of selective
mating.
Benham points out that, since his measures are of annual earnings, there
may be labor-supply effects submerged in the estimated relationship
between husband's earnings and wife's schooling. He notes (correctly)
that the direction of this effect is unclear on a priori grounds, but finds
empirically that an extra year of wife's schooling has only a slightly
smaller percentage effect on husband's weekly wage than on annual
earnings. In tabulations using a different body of data, I have verified
this result. I will briefly describe these computations.
I used the NBER-Thorndike sample of 4,519 white married males (wife
present) who entered the U.S. Air Force in 1943 and who were examined
as navigators and pilots at that time. Earnings are for 1969. Experience is
the number of years since the individual was last in school. The geometric
mean of earnings is over $ 13,000,1 and logarithmic variance is 0.24.
iEarningsfor 1969 are deflated to the 1958 value so as io allow life-cycle comparisons.
In the regressions below, I did not rescale this variable.
390Ic Researth
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COMMENT 391
The advantage of this sample is that data are available to permit
explicit consideration of the possible effects of selective mating. For
example, information on husbands includes: (1) schooling, (2) a measure
of IQ, (3) father's schooling and occupation, and (4) religion. It is clear
that the sample is rarefied, and it is consequently hard to judge how much
confidence should be placed in results contained within: For example,
essentially all respondents are white, completed high school, and on armed
forces tests scored in the upper one-half of the distribution.
On the other hand, in one important dimension, this sample is superior
to the national probability samples for isolating "pure" productivity
effects of wife's schooling. It is likely that the World War II marriage
market functioned somewhat differently from that in normal times—
possibly a careful matching of family background was less important
during the war. If so, then in this sample, containing a disproportionately
large number of men who were married during the war, there should be
less "pollution" with covariance between wife's schooling and husband's
family background.2 For example, Benham, in an unpublished table,
shows that, in the U.S. Census sample, the zero-order correlation between
husband's and wife's schooling is 0.65. In the NBER-Thorndike sample
the correlation is 0.38.
It is true that this lower correlation in the NBER-Thorndike sample
could be the result of truncation in the husband's schooling variable, but
it is important that if truncation reduces correlations it does not change
biases due to omitted variables. Yet, if the reduced correlation follows
from reduced covariance between wife's schooling and omitted variables
such as husband's IQor family background, which may themselves affect
earnings, then the reduced correlation reduces coefficient bias. Table 1
reports regression results for this sample.
Regression 1 is equivalent to regressions Benham presents in table lA,
and the results agree that there is a "significant" association between
wife's schooling and husband's earnings. There is a quantitative difference,
however; while a year of schooling for the husband has the same estimated
effect (6—7 percent) on earnings, the coefficient for wife's schooling is less
than one-half as high in the NBER-Thorndike sample as in the samples
used by Benham. Regression 2 includes the length-of-marriage variables
alaBenham's table 3. Here no evidence of a statistically significant
relationship exists. The computed F-statistic (2; 4,512 degrees of freedom)
is only 1.16. In any case, it is hard to interpret Benham's results vis-à-vis
length of marriage, for the marriage can itself be considered as a short
"period of investment."
Regression 3 introduces a decomposition of the wife's schooling variable
into two parts. The first part includes those components of a wife's
2Roughly17.5 percent of the NBER-Thorndike sample of men who had wives in 1969
had married those particular spouses between 1941 and 1944. Of this group of men,











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































schooling that are correlated with (and presumably would be predicted
by) her husband's IQ, religion, and his father's schooling and occupation.
The intention is simply that these variables would be among the most
obvious predictors of wife's schooling, based on a sociological "network"
or an assortive-mating frame of reference. The second part of the wife's
education is that which is orthogonal to the above list and is simply the
residuals between observed schooling and schooling predicted by re-
gression 4. It is this part of a wife's schooling that is independent of her
husband's background, religion, and measured IQ which is the obvious
candidate for the "pure" productivity effect posited by Benham. But in
these data there is little independent role for wife's education. Most of the
effect is channeled through the independent variables of regression 4.
To summarize these results, note first that the effect of a year of a wife's
schooling is 22 percent of the estimated effect of her husband's schooling.
Further, after "partialing out" effects of a husband's IQ and background
on his wife's schooling, the net effect of the wife's schooling is reduced to
slightly less than half its original level and the coefficient estimate is of
marginal statistical significance. The estimated net effect of a wife's
schooling is roughly one-tenth of the estimated effect of her husband's
schooling and is only one-fifth of Benham's estimate.
Does this then prove that the pure productivity effect is unimportant?
Clearly not. Aside from the peculiarities of this particular set of data, the
identification problems surrounding the Benham hypothesis are probably
insurmountable. For example, consider models of selective mating. If
d§ forcesfor selectivity exist in the absence of this cross-productivity (cross-
fertilization?) effect, they are clearly magnified by its existence.
• •.!2Part Four
Family Human